|author||Jesse Weinstein <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2015-10-22 22:54:45 -0700|
|committer||sajolida <email@example.com>||2015-10-30 10:25:23 +0000|
Last few native English fixes for pages linked from about.mdwn
4 files changed, 16 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/about/acknowledgments_and_similar_projects.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/about/acknowledgments_and_similar_projects.mdwn
index 958e001..a9228dd 100644
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Acknowledgements
Incognito author declared it to be dead on March 23rd, 2010, and
wrote that Tails "should be considered as its spiritual
- - The [[Privatix Live-System|http://mandalka.name/privatix/]] an
+ - The [[Privatix Live-System|http://mandalka.name/privatix/]] was an
early source of inspiration, too.
- Some ideas (in particular
[[tordate|contribute/design/Time_syncing]] and improvements to our
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys.mdwn
index 872cd5c..adfcfd1 100644
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Policy
The secret key material will never be stored on an online server or on
-systems managed by anyone else than Tails core developers.
+systems managed by anyone other than Tails core developers.
### Primary key
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ systems managed by anyone else than Tails core developers.
### Signing subkeys
-* Stored on OpenPGP smartcards owned by those who need it.
+* Stored on OpenPGP smartcards owned by those who need them.
Smartcards ensure that the cryptographic operations are done on the
smartcard itself and that the secret cryptographic material is not
directly available to the operating system using it.
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn
index 0941f37..0c2e7ce 100644
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ communication. Do you trust Tails and its developers? Do you think we
have planted backdoors in Tails so we can take control of your
computer, or that we make Tails generate compromised encryption keys
in order to enable the government to spy on you? Do you simply trust
-our word on that we are legit?
+our word that we are legit?
-No matter what your opinion is in this matter you should ask how you
-reached that conclusion. Both trust and distrust need to be
-established based on facts, not gut feeling, paranoid suspicion,
+No matter what your opinion is in this matter you should ask yourself how you
+reached your conclusion. Both trust and distrust need to be
+established based on facts, not gut feelings, paranoid suspicion,
unfounded hearsay or our word. Of course, we claim to be honest, but
written assurances are worthless. In order to make an informed
decision you must look at the greater picture of what Tails is
@@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ Free software and public scrutiny
Free software, [[like Tails|about/license]], enables its users to check
exactly what the software distribution consists of and how it
-functions since the source code must be made available to all who
+functions, since the source code must be made available to all who
receive it. Hence a thorough audit of the code can reveal if any
malicious code, like a backdoor, is present. Furthermore, with the
source code it is possible to build the software, and then compare the
result against any version that is already built and being
-distributed, like the Tails ISO images [[you can download from
+distributed, like the Tails ISO images that [[you can download from
us|download]]. That way it can be determined whether the distributed
version actually was built with the source code, or if any malicious
changes have been made.
@@ -82,11 +82,11 @@ One could say that Tails is the union of Debian and Tor. What we do,
essentially, is gluing it all together. Hence, if you trust Debian and
The Tor Project, what remains to establish trust for Tails is to trust
our "glue". As has been mentioned, Tails is Free software, so its
-source code is completely open for inspection, and it's mainly
-comprised by a specification of which Debian software packages to
-install, and how they should be configured. While Tails surely doesn't
+source code is completely open for inspection, and it mainly
+consists of a specification for which Debian software packages to
+install and how they should be configured. While Tails surely doesn't
get the same amount of attention as Debian or Tor, we do have some
-eyes on us from especially the Tor community, and also some of the
+eyes on us, especially the Tor community, and also some of the
general security community (see our [[audits page|security/audits]]).
Given that Tails' source code is comparably small and devoid of
complexities, we're in a pretty good spot compared to many other
diff --git a/wiki/src/press.mdwn b/wiki/src/press.mdwn
index 22f6336..953101a 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ the website. Write us an email at <firstname.lastname@example.org> if you want
to receive future press releases, or if you have a press inquiry.
You can also send press articles about Tails to this address, so we
-add them to this page :)
+can add them to this page. :)
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Older media appearances
-* 2014-12-01: is awarded the [November 2014 DistroWatch.com
+* 2014-12-01: Tails was awarded the [November 2014 DistroWatch.com
* 2014-06-06: Tails received an honorable mention at
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ Awards
particular, the jury wishes to highlight the Tails project, for
breaking ground in the area of user privacy protection."
-* 2014-03-11: Tails [wins the 2014 Access Innovation
+* 2014-03-11: Tails won the [2014 Access Innovation
for Endpoint Security. Access reports that "Tails embodies the
successful collaboration of developers, trainers, security