path: root/wiki/src/contribute/design.mdwn
diff options
authorintrigeri <>2017-06-12 07:35:28 +0000
committerintrigeri <>2017-06-12 07:35:28 +0000
commit3ff95776cc17ccd3556a4508401f97402c1991ca (patch)
tree6cbfdaa069073dd924265845f22cd5d2c3f03c68 /wiki/src/contribute/design.mdwn
parent4468041de38b2f37a99c8b661ea6c3d496576409 (diff)
TBB → Tor Browser
Diffstat (limited to 'wiki/src/contribute/design.mdwn')
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/wiki/src/contribute/design.mdwn b/wiki/src/contribute/design.mdwn
index a6367e3..77f5359 100644
--- a/wiki/src/contribute/design.mdwn
+++ b/wiki/src/contribute/design.mdwn
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ information leaks, decreasing attack surface and similar. The actual
binaries etc. used in Tails are those distributed by the Tor Project,
but the configuration differs slightly, which is described below.
-In Tails we diverge from the TBB's one-profile-only design, and
+In Tails we diverge from the Tor Browser's one-profile-only design, and
install the Tor Browser in a globally accessible directory used by all
browser profiles (and other XUL applications).
@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ lot of stuff not needed in Tails (error checking mainly) and isn't
flexible since it looks for the browser profile in a specific
place. Our custom script makes use of the global installation and also
makes sure the default profile is used as a basis. Any shared libraries
-shipped inside the TBB are also used (via `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`) since
+shipped inside the Tor Browser are also used (via `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`) since
Debian stable often has too old versions to start the browser.
Whenever the user tries to start the Tor Browser before Tor is
@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ The remaining configuration differences can be found in:
- [[!tails_gitweb config/chroot_local-hooks/14-generate-tor-browser-profile]]
- [[!tails_gitweb config/chroot_local-hooks/15-symlink-places.sqlite]]
-It should also be noted that the global TBB installation is also used
+It should also be noted that the global Tor Browser installation is also used
for the [[Unsafe Browser]], although it is
user-isolated and use a separate profile with very different
@@ -1414,14 +1414,14 @@ Bundle and the known differences, if any, are listed in the [[known
issues|support/known_issues]] page.
However the fact that different browser extensions are installed in Tails and in
-the TBB surely allows more sophisticated attacks that usual fingerprint
+the Tor Browser surely allows more sophisticated attacks that usual fingerprint
as returned by tools such as <> and
<>. For example, the fact that uBlock Origin is removing
ads could be analysed.
From the point of view of the local network administrator, Tails is
almost exclusively generating Tor activity and that is probably quite
-different from other TBB users. We believe this would be hard to avoid.
+different from other Tor Browser users. We believe this would be hard to avoid.
Other possible fingerprint issues on the LAN or ISP exist but we believe
they would be harder to detect. See the discussion on fingerprinting in
the [[Time sync|contribute/design/Time_syncing]] design document and the