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authorxin <xin@riseup.net>2016-05-10 15:43:53 (GMT)
committerxin <xin@riseup.net>2016-05-10 15:43:53 (GMT)
commit0c3455191b2f81f546e66d9c61d16fa54049f4fc (patch)
treee375b520923e1878070c1f69baf9ea71f8897bd6 /wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn
parent22918016db377318f4eba5b3f46206ced806394a (diff)
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@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does not,
and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the
destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic
passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on
-communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad).
+communications?](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop).
For example, in 2007, a security researcher intercepted thousands of private
e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the
world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was running.
See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's
-Paradise](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks).
+Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks).
**To protect yourself from such attacks you should use end-to-end encryption.**
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit
node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a
man-in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node
doing MITM
-attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks).
+attacks](https://web.archive.org/web/20120113162841/http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-node-doing-mitm-attacks).
**Again, to protect yourself from such attacks you should use end-to-end
encryption** and while doing so taking extra care at verifying the server
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ to create a new user account that issued nine certificate signing requests for
seven domains: mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com
(three certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee.
See [Comodo: The Recent RA
-Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-recent-ra-compromise/).
+Compromise](https://blog.comodo.com/other/the-recent-ra-compromise/).
Later in 2011, DigiNotar, a Dutch SSL certificate company, incorrectly issued
certificates to a malicious party or parties. Later on, it came to light that
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ who happen to use Tor.
<p class="quoted-from">Quoted from [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack
desc="Wikipedia: %s"]], [[!wikipedia
-Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc="Wikipedia: %s"]] and <a
+Comodo_Group#Certificate_hacking desc="Wikipedia: %s"]] and <a
href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion">Tor
Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser
collusion</a>.</p>