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authorTails developers <amnesia@boum.org>2014-11-24 15:45:49 (GMT)
committerTails developers <amnesia@boum.org>2014-11-24 15:45:49 (GMT)
commit5101f356cab440f2b4cc3ef229bc08e23955411a (patch)
treef092c40e5565ca7fa140bf1f3659cdf0d498eeb2 /wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn
parent2439abd43a743b11852b6e444459615088b98ae0 (diff)
Fix typo.
Thanks to Matt Kraai <kraai@ftbfs.org> for the patch!
Diffstat (limited to 'wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn')
-rw-r--r--wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn
index 54b97f6..2c7fdc3 100644
--- a/wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn
+++ b/wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-recent-ra-comp
Later in 2011, DigiNotar, a Dutch SSL certificate company, incorrectly issued
certificates to a malicious party or parties. Later on, it came to light that
they were apparently compromised months before or perhaps even in May of 2009 if
-not earlier. Rogues certificates were issued for domains such as google.com,
+not earlier. Rogue certificates were issued for domains such as google.com,
mozilla.org, torproject.org, login.yahoo.com and many more. See, [The Tor
Project: The DigiNotar Debacle, and what you should do about
it](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-debacle-and-what-you-should-do-about-it).