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authorxin <xin@riseup.net>2019-01-14 12:13:44 +0000
committerxin <xin@riseup.net>2019-01-14 12:24:39 +0000
commitf7d26a70806a389481307e6e0ef4823fe68cdcbf (patch)
tree557e02ac0d6adeee899c93e582f3a6f14052a904 /wiki/src/doc
parent64d58e436c958d28de92c1acfb7240cbb9ccdcf2 (diff)
Fix when documentation talk about ISO instead of USB (will-fix: #16354)
Diffstat (limited to 'wiki/src/doc')
-rw-r--r--wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.mdwn4
-rw-r--r--wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn2
-rw-r--r--wiki/src/doc/first_steps/upgrade.mdwn4
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.mdwn
index 1a1779d..0a1d672 100644
--- a/wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.mdwn
+++ b/wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.mdwn
@@ -133,11 +133,11 @@ interest of Tails.
The bad things that could happen if the mechanism fails are:
A. The signing key is not revoked while it should be. This could allow
-possible attackers to distribute malicious Tails ISO images or publish
+possible attackers to distribute malicious Tails images or publish
malicious information on our name.
B. The signing key is revoked when it should not have been. This would
-prevent people from verifying our ISO images with OpenPGP until we
+prevent people from verifying our images with OpenPGP until we
publish a new signing key.
Distribution of the shares
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn
index 649a739..79d3735 100644
--- a/wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn
+++ b/wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ receive it. Hence a thorough audit of the code can reveal if any
malicious code, like a backdoor, is present. Furthermore, with the
source code it is possible to build the software, and then compare the
result against any version that is already built and being
-distributed, like the Tails ISO images that you can download from
+distributed, like the Tails images that you can download from
us. That way it can be determined whether the distributed
version actually was built with the source code, or if any malicious
changes have been made.
diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/first_steps/upgrade.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/first_steps/upgrade.mdwn
index 2d68be4..bea1c0e 100644
--- a/wiki/src/doc/first_steps/upgrade.mdwn
+++ b/wiki/src/doc/first_steps/upgrade.mdwn
@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ The advantages of this technique are the following:
- You only need a single Tails USB stick. The upgrade is done on the fly from a
running Tails. After upgrading, you can restart and use the new version.
- - The upgrade is much smaller to download than a full ISO image.
+ - The upgrade is much smaller to download than a full USB image.
- The upgrade mechanism includes cryptographic verification of the upgrade.
- You don't have to verify the ISO image yourself anymore.
+ You don't have to verify the USB image yourself anymore.
Requirements: