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authorsajolida <sajolida@pimienta.org>2015-04-24 19:28:32 +0000
committersajolida <sajolida@pimienta.org>2015-04-24 19:28:32 +0000
commit70904ac58bdf8396af672a7fe91f999d20d567a6 (patch)
treee3e1de331b8af1a25ce7ec2d3a1a49fdd35f8cb2 /wiki/src/support/faq.mdwn
parent42c3676952fe73aa1b66d2a4fbc8c46d43ff1f2d (diff)
Many minor rephrasing
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1 files changed, 11 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/wiki/src/support/faq.mdwn b/wiki/src/support/faq.mdwn
index a0e6fec..4342220 100644
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+++ b/wiki/src/support/faq.mdwn
@@ -151,21 +151,22 @@ you might break things. Upgrading when you get a notification from
<a id="preinstalled"></a>
-Can I buy preinstalled Tails?
------------------------------
+Can I buy a preinstalled Tails device?
+--------------------------------------
No, we don't sell preinstalled Tails devices.
-Selling preinstalled Tails would in fact be a pretty bad idea:
+Selling preinstalled devices would in fact be a pretty bad idea:
-* If burned on DVD, then the DVD gets outdated after 6 weeks at most;
-* If installed onto a USB stick, users would not be able to verify
- that the Tails on the USB stick is genuine. Trusting a certain Tails
- is a genuine one is either based on cryptographic verification, or
- on personal trust (someone you trust cloning a Tails for you). But
+* If burned on a DVD, then this DVD would be outdated on the next
+ release. This means after 6 weeks at most.
+* If installed onto a USB stick, then it would be impossible to verify
+ that the Tails on the USB stick is genuine. Trusting that a Tails device
+ is genuine should be based either on cryptographic verification or
+ on personal trust (if you know someone of trust who can clone a Tails device for you). But
once Tails is installed on a USB stick it is not possible to use our
- recommended verification techniques anymore. Being able of trusting
- the Tails you use is something we really care about;
+ cryptographic verification techniques anymore. Being able to trust
+ your Tails device is something that we really care about.
* Distributing cloned Tails USB sticks would sabotage the plausible
deniability feature we want to add [[!tails_ticket 5929]] regarding
the persistent volume.