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[[!toc levels=4]]

See also:

 * the [[corresponding design document|contribute/design/incremental_upgrades]];
 * the tickets with the _Incremental upgrades_ category on [[!tails_redmine "" desc="Redmine"]].

# Random ideas for future improvements

These are not worth creating tickets yet, as it's not even clear these
changes are useful enough to put time in it.

### Packaging could be more self-contained

Move `/etc/sudoers.d/zzz_upgrade` and IUK-related user creation from
the Tails main Git repository to the `tails-iuk` Debian package, so
that it's more self-contained and easier to test.

### Button for aborting upgrade cleanly

### Compute and display ETA

### Multi-step incremental upgrade

E.g. 0.11 boots after 0.11.1 and 0.11.2 are out. Tails fetches
https://tails.boum.org/upgrade/v1/Tails/0.11/i386/stable/upgrades.yml,
that shall contain an incremental upgrade path with two target files:
the 0.11 to 0.11.1 IUK, and the 0.11.1 to 0.11.2 IUK. The upgrader
would download these two files and install the two IUKs in the
correct order.

### sharing upgrade material

Once the incremental upgrade has been applied, I may be proposed to
save a copy of the target files to a location of my choosing.

### allow one to download target files in the clear

The downloader program could provide an opt-in way to have the
download happen in the clear, that is without going through the Tor
network. It looks doable given it's a separate process: we may run it
as a dedicated user, and reuse the `clearnet` infrastructure
implemented for the Unsafe Browser.

[[!tails_ticket 7878]]

### "Retry with new circuit" button

Circuit throughput varies wildly, and since this is a large download,
it'll quickly wear out users' patience if a bad circuit is picked.
Or maybe this can happen behind the scenes, e.g.:  Automatically
switch circuit every X minutes or Y% progress? That could even make
fingerprinting the download on the Tor client <-> Entry Node side of
the pipe a bit more difficult, for whatever that's worth.

### Surviving key compromise

* https://wiki.ubuntu.com/ImageBasedUpgrades/GPG