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# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE
# Copyright (C) YEAR Free Software Foundation, Inc.
# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package.
# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, YEAR.
#
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-05-27 15:17+0300\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-06-14 21:11-0000\n"
"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
"Language: \n"
"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "[[!meta title=\"Warning\"]]\n"
msgstr "[[!meta title=\"Warnung\"]]\n"

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Even though we're doing our best to offer you good tools to protect your "
"privacy while using a computer, **there is no magic or perfect solution to "
"such a complex problem**. Understanding well the limits of such tools is a "
"crucial step in, first, deciding whether Tails is the right tool for you, "
"and second, helping you making a good use of it."
msgstr ""
"Obwohl wir unser Bestes geben, um Ihnen gute Werkzeuge anzubieten, die Ihre "
"Privatsphäre während der Benutzung eines Computers schützen, **gibt es keine "
"Magie und keine perfekte Lösung zu einem solch komplexen Problem**. Die "
"Grenzen dieser Werkzeuge zu verstehen, ist ein sehr wichtiger Schritt, um "
"erstens zu entscheiden, ob Tails das Richtige für Sie ist, und zweitens "
"hilft es Ihnen Tails sinnvoll einzusetzen."

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "[[!toc levels=2]]\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<a id=\"exit_node\"></a>\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on communications\n"
msgstr "Tor Austritts-Knoten können Verbindungen abhören\n"

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "**Tor is about hiding your location, not about encrypting your communication.**\n"
msgstr "**Tor soll deinen Aufenthaltsort verbergen, nicht deine Verbindung verschlüsseln.**\n"

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Instead of taking a direct route from source to destination, communications "
"using the Tor network take a random pathway through several Tor relays that "
"cover your tracks. So no observer at any single point can tell where the "
"data came from or where it's going."
msgstr ""
"Anstatt einen direkten Weg vom Ausgangspunkt zum Ziel zu nehmen, verlaufen "
"Verbindungen über das Tor-Netzwerk auf einem zufälligen Weg über mehrere Tor-"
"Relais, sodass kein Beobachter an irgendeinem Ort sagen kann, wo die Daten "
"herkamen oder wohin sie übertragen werden."

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "[[!img htw2-tails.png link=no alt=\"A Tor connection usually goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual connection to the final destination\"]]\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The last relay on this circuit, called the exit node, is the one that "
"establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does "
"not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic "
"passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on "
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/"
"TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For example, in 2007, a security researcher intercepted thousands of private "
"e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the "
"world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was "
"running.  See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's "
"Paradise.](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/"
"embassy_hacks)."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "**To protect yourself from such attacks you should use end-to-end encryption.**\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**Tails includes many tools to help you using strong encryption** while\n"
"browsing, sending email or chatting, as presented on our [[about\n"
"page|/about#cryptography]].\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<a id=\"fingerprint\"></a>\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**Your Internet Service Provider (ISP) or your local network administrator**\n"
"can see that you're connecting to a Tor relay, and not a normal web server for\n"
"example. Using [[Tor bridges in certain\n"
"conditions|first_steps/startup_options/bridge_mode]] can help you hide the fact\n"
"that you are using Tor.\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**The destination server that you are contacting through Tor** can know whether your\n"
"communication comes out from a Tor exit node by consulting the publicly\n"
"available list of exit nodes that might contact it. For example using the [Tor\n"
"Bulk Exit List tool](https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py) of\n"
"the Tor Project.\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**So using Tails doesn't make you look like any random Internet user.**\n"
"The anonymity provided by Tor and Tails works by trying to make all of their\n"
"users look the same so it's not possible to identify who is who amongst them.\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid "See also [[Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?|fingerprint]]"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<a id=\"man-in-the-middle\"></a>\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Man-in-the-middle attacks\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"A man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) is a form of active eavesdropping in which "
"the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays "
"messages between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to "
"each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation "
"is controlled by the attacker."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "[[!img man-in-the-middle.png link=no alt=\"Illustration of a man-in-the-middle attack\"]]\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<!-- Source: wiki/lib/man-in-the-middle.svg -->\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"While using Tor, man-in-the-middle attacks can still happen between the exit "
"node and the destination server. The exit node itself can also act as a man-"
"in-the-middle. For an example of such an attack see [MW-Blog: TOR exit-node "
"doing MITM attacks](http://www.teamfurry.com/wordpress/2007/11/20/tor-exit-"
"node-doing-mitm-attacks)."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**Again, to protect yourself from such attacks you should use end-to-end\n"
"encryption** and while doing so taking extra care at verifying the server\n"
"authenticity.\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"Usually, this is automatically done throught SSL certificates checked by your\n"
"browser against a given set of recognized [[!wikipedia\n"
"Certificate_authority desc=\"certificate authorities\"]]).\n"
"If you get a security exception message such as this one you might be victim of\n"
"a man-in-the-middle attack and should not bypass it unless you have another\n"
"trusted way of checking the certificate's fingerprint with the people running\n"
"the service.\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "[[!img ssl_warning.png link=no alt=\"This Connection is Untrusted\"]]\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"But on top of that the certificate authorities model of trust on Internet is "
"susceptible to various methods of compromise."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For example, on March 15, 2011, Comodo, one of the major SSL certificates "
"company, reported that a user account with an affiliate registration "
"authority had been compromised. It was then used to create a new user "
"account that issued nine certificate signing requests for seven domains: "
"mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (three "
"certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee.  See "
"[Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-"
"security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Later in 2011, DigiNotar, a Dutch SSL certificate company, incorrectly "
"issued certificates to a malicious party or parties. Later on, it came to "
"light that they were apparently compromised months before or perhaps even in "
"May of 2009 if not earlier. Rogues certificates were issued for domains such "
"as google.com, mozilla.org, torproject.org, login.yahoo.com and many more. "
"See, [The Tor Project: The DigiNotar Debacle, and what you should do about "
"it](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-debacle-and-what-you-should-"
"do-about-it)."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**This still leaves open the possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack even when\n"
"your browser is trusting an HTTPS connection.**\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"On one hand, by providing anonymity, Tor makes it more difficult to perform "
"a man-in-the-middle attack targeted at **one specific person** with the "
"blessing of a rogue SSL certificate. But on the other end, Tor makes it "
"easier for people or organizations running exit nodes to perform large scale "
"MitM attempts, or attacks targeted at **a specific server**, and especially "
"those among its users who happen to use Tor."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from [[!wikipedia Man-in-the-middle_attack\n"
"desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]], [[!wikipedia\n"
"Comodo_Group#Iran_SSL_certificate_controversy desc=\"Wikipedia: %s\"]] and <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion\">Tor\n"
"Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser\n"
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Confirmation attacks\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or "
"measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out "
"of the Tor network. That's because if you can see both flows, some simple "
"statistics let you decide whether they match up."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network "
"administrator)  and the ISP of the destination server (or the destination "
"server itself)  cooperate to attack you."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
"confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries "
"to confirm an hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network "
"and then doing the math."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
"is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Tails doesn't encrypt your documents by default\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The documents that you might save on storage devices will not be encrypted "
"by default. But Tails provides you with tools to encrypt your documents, "
"such as GnuPG, or encrypt your storage device, such as LUKS. It is likely "
"that the files you may create will keep tracks that they were created using "
"Tails."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**If you need to access the local hard-disks** of the computer you are using, be\n"
"conscious that you might then leave trace of your activities with Tails on it.\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"Tails doesn't clear the metadata of your documents for you and doesn't encrypt the Subject: and other headers of your encrypted e-mail messages\n"
"===========================================================================================\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Numerous files format store hidden data or metadata inside of the files. "
"Text processors or PDF files could store the name of the author, the date "
"and time of creation of the file, and sometimes even parts of the editing "
"history of the file… those hidden data depend on the file format and the "
"software used. Please note also, that the Subject: as well as the rest of "
"the header lines of your OpenPGP encrypted e-mail messages are not "
"encrypted. This is not a bug of Tails or the [OpenPGP](http://www.mozilla-"
"enigmail.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=328) protocol; it's for backwards "
"compatibility with the original SMTP protocol. Unfortunately no RFC standard "
"exists yet for Subject encryption."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Images file formats, like TIFF of JPEG, probably take the prize in this "
"field.  Those files, created by digital cameras or mobile phones, contain a "
"metadata format called EXIF which can include the date, time and sometimes "
"the GPS coordinates of the picture, the brand and serial number of the "
"device which took it as well as a thumbnail of the original image. Image "
"processing software tend to keep those data intact. Internet is full of "
"cropped or blurred images for which the EXIF thumbnail still contains the "
"full original picture."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**Tails doesn't clear the metadata of your files for you**. Yet. Still it's in\n"
"Tails' design goal to help you do that. For example, Tails already comes with\n"
"the [Metadata anonymisation toolkit](https://mat.boum.org/).\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"A global passive adversary would be a person or an entity able to monitor at "
"the same time the traffic between all the computers in a network. By "
"studying, for example, the timing and volume patterns of the different "
"communications across the network, it would be statistically possible to "
"identify Tor circuits and thus matching Tor users and destination servers."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"It is part of Tor's initial trade-off not to address such a threat in order "
"to create a low-latency communication service usable for web browsing, "
"Internet chat or SSH connections."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For more expert information see [Tor Project: The Second-Generation Onion "
"Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design."
"pdf), part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<a id=\"identities\"></a>\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"It is usually not advisable to use the same Tails session to perform two "
"tasks or endorse two contextual identities that you really want to keep "
"separate from another. For example hiding your location to check your email "
"and publishing anonymously a document."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"First, because Tor tends to reuse the same circuits, for example amongst a "
"same browsing session. Since the exit node of a circuit knows both the "
"destination server (and possibly the content of the communication if not "
"encrypted) and the address of the previous relay it received the "
"communication from, it makes it easier to correlate the several browsing "
"requests as part of a same circuit and possibly made by a same user. If you "
"are facing a global adversary as described above, it might then also be in "
"position to do this correlation."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Second, in case of a security hole or a misuse in using Tails or one of its "
"application, information about your session could be leaked. That could "
"reveal that the same person was behind the various actions made during the "
"session."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"**The solution to both threats is to shutdown and restart Tails** every time\n"
"you're using a new identity, if you really want to isolate them better.\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Vidalia's \"New Identity\" button forces Tor to use new circuits but only "
"for new connections: existing connections might stay open. Plus, apart from "
"the Tor circuits, other kind of information can reveal your past activities, "
"for example the cookies stored by your browser. So this feature of Vidalia "
"is not a solution to really separate contextual identities. Shutdown and "
"restart Tails instead."
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tor allows you to be anonymous online; Tails allows you to leave no trace on "
"the computer you're using. But again, **neither of both are magic spells for "
"computer security**."
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"If you use weak passwords, they can be guessed by brute-force attacks with or\n"
"without Tails in the same way. To know if your passwords are weak and learn good\n"
"practices to create better password, you can read [[!wikipedia\n"
"Weak_password#Examples_of_weak_passwords desc=\"Wikipedia: Weak Passwords\"]].\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Title =
#, no-wrap
msgid "Tails is a work in progress\n"
msgstr ""

#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tails, as well as all the software it includes, are on continuous "
"development and might contain programming errors or security holes. [[Stay "
"tuned|download#stay_tuned]] to Tails development."
msgstr ""